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Open Source Human Evolution 
Andrew W. Torrance  
INTRODUCTION 
Genetic engineering of humans holds the potential of transforming 
the human body and mind. In fact, it may become a dominant 
influence on the future evolutionary trajectory (or trajectories) of 
humanity. Genetic engineering already allows humans to alter 
genomes in a highly targeted manner and to yield genetically novel 
organisms with distinctively new traits in a single generation. 
Deliberate alteration of specific genes in a single generation can 
achieve genetic changes in organisms that formerly took many 
generations to achieve. The results have included such novelties as 
glow-in-the-dark tobacco plants, laboratory mice that develop cancer 
almost on command, and corn plants almost impervious to their usual 
pest insects. Genetically ―enhanced‖ humans may not be far behind.1 
Beyond some restrictions on federal funding,
2
 genetic engineering 
remains relatively free of legal encumbrances in the United States. 
Genetic engineering research and development tend to be relatively 
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 1. This Article uses the descriptors ―enhance‖ and ―enhancement‖ sensu Henry T. 
Greely. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Regulating Human Biological Enhancements: Questionable 
Justifications and International Complications, 4 SANTA CLARA J. INT‘L L. 87 (2006). 
 2. Federal funds are unavailable to support research on human cloning, a technique that 
can involve somatic cell nuclear transfer, a process likely to facilitate human genetic 
enhancement. LEE SILVER, REMAKING EDEN—HOW GENETIC ENGINEERING AND CLONING 
WILL TRANSFORM THE AMERICAN FAMILY 152 (1998). 
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expensive, encouraging reliance on the patent system to protect the 
considerable investment required. Since 1980, when the United States 
Supreme Court confirmed the patentability of genetically engineered 
eubacteria,
3
 patent protection has been available for newly discovered 
or synthesized genes and related technologies. Patents can confer 
strong rights to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or 
selling patented genes and related technologies within the United 
States, or to exclude others from importing patented genes into the 
United States.
4
 Because chemical and pharmaceutical patents appear 
to generate net economic benefits to their owners,
5
 availability of 
patent protection for gene and gene-related inventions may promote 
innovation in those types of inventions. The prospect of patent 
protection may promote research and development of more new 
genes and gene-related technologies. Thus, the patent system may 
lead to the creation of more raw material for human genetic 
enhancement while simultaneously limiting access to its applications. 
Genetic engineering may allow human parents to choose the traits 
of their biological children precisely and predictably, where, 
previously, such trait selection only could be accomplished by 
selecting a mate possessing a subset of desired traits, and then hoping 
that at least some of those traits were heritable. With genetic 
engineering, and the high-fidelity genetic trait selection it may allow, 
human evolution has the potential to become a fine-tuned, deliberate, 
and directed process. According to the title of a book addressing 
human genetic enhancement and public policy, human evolution may 
change course, ―From Chance to Choice.‖6 
The patent system may influence parents‘ choice of genetic traits 
for their children. In fact, gene and gene-related patents may enable 
private policing of genetic engineering technologies, with strong 
implications for the evolutionary future of humanity. Parents wishing 
to ensure that their children receive particular traits might have to 
secure permission from owners of patents claiming such traits, and 
 
 3. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 4. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003). 
 5. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 16 (2008). 
 6. ALLEN BUCHANEN, DAN W. BROCK, NORMAN DANIELS & DANIEL WIKLER, FROM 
CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS & JUSTICE (2001). 
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then pay for such permission. Although not all genes or gene-related 
inventions would be protected by patents, many genes would be. In 
fact, research and development into especially advantageous genes 
could spur ever more genetic innovations that might become 
available to parents in the genetic enhancement marketplace. Genetic 
enhancement of children, though controversial, looks set to proceed 
apace. 
Open source biology offers the prospect of an alternative approach 
to the invention of new medicines and therapies, including those with 
a genetic basis. An open source approach has been suggested as being 
especially suited to under-researched diseases, such as those that 
predominate in the developing world.
7
 Although precisely defining 
what is meant by ―open source‖ is difficult, one prominent definition 
has been proposed by the Open Source Initiative (―OSI‖).8 The OSI 
definition mandates that, to qualify as open source, a particular set of 
software code must be made available to others under the terms of an 
agreement that includes at least ten specified criteria.
9
 These criteria 
include free redistribution, availability of the source code, and 
permission to develop derivative works.
10
 Open source biology offers 
an approach to biological research whose parameters are adapted 
from the open source software model. Although open source 
biological approaches have been criticized for lacking incentives to 
biological innovation as effective as those offered by patent 
systems,
11
 a number of recent initiatives, such as the Tropical 
Diseases Initiative (―TDI‖), have begun to test the advantages and 
disadvantages of open source biology.
12
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for Tropical 
Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLOS MED. 183 (2004), available at http://medicine. 
plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi+10.1371/journal.pmed.0010056. 
 8. Open Source Initiative Homepage, http://www.opensource.org (last visited on Mar 17, 
2009). 
 9. The Open Source Definition, http://opensource.org/docs/osd (last visited on Mar. 17, 
2009). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See., e.g., David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Genome, or Coase and Open Source 
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004). 
 12. The Tropical Disease Initiative, http://www.tropicaldisease.org (last visited on Mar. 
17, 2009). 
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If open source biology were applied to genetics, the results for 
human genetic enhancement could be significant. The application of 
open source genetics could affect rates of genetic innovation and 
access to enhancing genes. Part I of this Article introduces the 
biology of evolutionary change. Part II discusses the current state of 
genetic engineering and its potential application to human genetic 
enhancement. Parts III and IV discuss the legal contours of 
proprietary patent and open source genetics models of innovation, 
respectively, and consider what differences the two alternative 
models might have on rates of genetic innovation and access to 
genetic innovations. Part V analyzes the effects that proprietary 
patent models and open source genetics models could have on the 
future trajectory of human genetic enhancement, and suggests that 
open source genetics would likely yield a relatively lower rate of 
genetic innovation coupled with democratized wider access to the 
resulting smaller number of genetic enhancements. 
This Article explores legal, policy, and societal implications that 
the patent and open source biology systems may hold as alternative 
methods for regulating human genetic enhancement. It argues that 
public policy must grapple with these implications before current 
technological possibilities become societal realities. It further 
suggests that open source genetics offers a significant alternative to 
the prospect of the patent system as arbiter of parental decisions 
regarding genetic enhancement of their children. The choices society 
makes about how to regulate access to human genetic enhancement 
could have important implications even for future trajectory of 
human evolution. 
I. EVOLUTION
13
 
A. Early Evolution 
Biologists estimate that life on earth first arose more than four 
billion years ago. In its earliest form, life was probably little more 
than a simple single cell composed of a phospholipid cell membrane 
 
 13. This section is adapted from Andrew W. Torrance, Patenting Human Evolution, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1075, 1077–84 (2008). 
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within which was housed a mixture of just enough simple nucleic 
acids, proteins, carbohydrates, and lipids to allow the cell to carry out 
basic survival functions, such as metabolism, and to make faithful 
copies of itself. Over time, in response to both the natural selection 
imposed by environmental conditions and random genetic drift, this 
single-celled organism and its offspring gave rise to every lineage of 
life on earth, from microscopic archaea and eubacteria, to gargantuan 
sequoias and whales, to humans.  
Some lineages of life met their demise through extinction. Others 
gave rise to additional lineages that persist into the present day. 
Surviving lineages include organisms spanning the range of physical 
size from single cells to multiple cells to billions of cells. 
Evolutionary success can be measured by considering any number of 
criteria, such as evolutionary radiation (that is, the number of 
relatively closely related lineages), location within a trophic web (that 
is, who eats whom), longevity, physical size, speed, complexity of 
social behavior, or cognitive capacity. However, the ultimate measure 
of evolutionary success is survival and reproduction into the next 
generation. If a lineage has persisted into the present day, it is more 
successful than those lineages already extinguished by the mere fact 
of its continued existence and its unbroken ability to transmit its 
genes from past to future generations. 
B. Human Evolution 
Modern humans are genetically very different from their ancient 
human ancestors. Over the past five to ten million years, an 
evolutionary lineage arose in Africa and acquired, among many other 
distinctive characteristics, bipedal gait, a brain very large relative to 
body size, and highly complex social behavior. This lineage is the 
humans, and includes modern Homo sapiens, the single extant 
species of the family Hominidae. Over the course of human 
evolution, ancestors of modern humans underwent radical changes in 
morphology (for example, body, head, foot, hand, and pelvis shape 
and size), physiology (for example, hidden estrus), and behavioral 
ecology (for example, grammatical and symbolic language and tool 
use). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A widespread assumption exists that modern humans have ceased 
evolving. Some derive this conclusion from religion, many varieties 
of which view humans as the apogee, or even the perfected final 
product, of biological evolution.
14
 Others posit that human 
technological mastery of the natural world has allowed humanity to 
sidestep nature, red in tooth and claw, avoiding the effects of natural 
selection entirely, and has ―stopped human evolution cold.‖15 Still 
others suggest that cultural evolution,
16
 which can act much more 
quickly than biological evolution,
17
 has displaced biological 
evolution as the dominant force molding humanity, and that, while 
human ideas may evolve, human genes no longer do. 
Even some biologists have sounded the demise of human 
evolution. Julian Huxley, for example, suggested that ―the more 
elaborate social life is, the more it tends to shield individuals from the 
action of natural selection.‖18 Stephen Palumbi has outlined the 
hypothesis of human evolutionary stasis as follows: 
When we provide medical treatment to the injured, give food 
to the hungry, replace brute muscle with John Deere tractors—
the argument goes—we prevent selection from weeding out a 
myriad of weak or physically imperfect individuals. Because 
we can clothe ourselves in winter, feed ourselves from 
storehouses during droughts, predict tsunamis and the paths of 
hurricanes—the argument continues—we break the link 
between physical variation among different humans and 
differences in reproductive success.
19
 
However, actual biological evidence suggests that evolution by 
natural selection still strongly affects humans.
20
 Technological 
 
 14. Of course, some religions include beliefs that are inconsistent or incompatible with the 
very existence of biological evolution. 
 15. STEVEN R. PALUMBI, THE EVOLUTION EXPLOSION: HOW HUMANS CAUSE RAPID 
EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 211 (2001). 
 16. Also known as ―exo-somatic evolution‖ and ―technological evolution.‖ 
 17. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE ANCESTOR‘S TALE: A PILGRIMAGE TO THE DAWN OF TIME 
26 (2004). 
 18. PALUMBI, supra note 15, at 209. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 211–30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Open Source Human Evolution 99 
 
 
development has ―failed to halt human physical evolution.‖21 
Although some of the natural selective forces acting to change human 
genotypes and phenotypes may have changed (for example, predation 
by other large organisms certainly plays a much lesser role than once 
it did), humans continue to evolve today. 
C. Evolution and Genes 
Darwin‘s theory of evolution by natural selection depends upon 
three observations about the natural world: first, ―[a]ll organisms tend 
to produce more offspring than can possibly survive‖22 in a world of 
limited resources; second, offspring tend not to be identical, but vary 
among themselves; and third, at least some of this variation is 
inherited by future generations.
23
 As an inference from these three 
observations ―on average . . . survivors will tend to be those 
individuals with variations that are fortuitously best suited to 
changing local environments. Since heredity exists, the offspring of 
survivors will tend to resemble their successful parents. The 
accumulation of these favorable variants through time will produce 
evolutionary change.‖24 
All organisms are subject to natural selection, including humans. 
Despite apparent mastery of many aspects of their environment, 
humans continue to evolve with every new generation. 
Evolution in its most general sense simply means change over 
time. Biological (or organic) evolution (hereinafter simply 
―evolution‖) refers to ―[g]enetic changes in lineages of organisms 
over time. Through this process, a lineage may split and diversify 
into new species.‖25 Evolution is universal. It occurs in every lineage. 
While there may be an implicit assumption, especially outside of the 
scientific communities, that evolution is something that happens only 
to organisms other than humans, it would be remarkable, and 
 
 21. Id. at 211. 
 22. STEPHEN J. GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF EXCELLENCE FROM PLATO TO 
DARWIN 138 (1996). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Tree of Life Glossary, http://tolweb.org/tree/home.pages/glossary.html#evolution (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
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extremely improbable, if human evolution were to cease. Evolution is 
continuous. Though rates of evolution certainly fluctuate, whether 
due to natural selective challenges or to mere stochasticity, genetic 
changes in lineages of organisms march ever onward. Even humanity 
experiences continuous genetic changes over time. 
Evolution can occur rapidly. Though some evolutionary changes 
take long periods of time, rates of evolutionary change need not be 
slow. Numerous examples exist of rapid evolution within populations 
of microbes. Perhaps the most prominent example of rapid microbial 
evolution is the emergence of antibiotic-resistance among some 
infectious eubacteria, such as Staphylococcus aureus, Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, and Salmonella species.
26
 Rapid evolution has also been 
observed in much larger multicellular organisms, such as insects.
27
 
However, even vertebrates appear capable of rapid evolution. A 
series of studies of Anolis lizards on Caribbean islands by Jonathan 
Losos‘s research group have challenged assumptions that vertebrate 
evolution requires many generations and long periods of time.
28
 
Based on an empirical study tracking evolutionary change in Anolis 
sagrei lizards found on six small Bahamian islands, Losos‘s group 
observed that 
[b]ecause of its potentially epochal scope, evolutionary biology 
is often caricatured as a strictly descriptive science, but recent 
years have shown that evolution can be studied on short time 
scales and that evolutionary biology can be both experimental 
and predictive. . . . [W]e showed that selection dramatically 
changed direction over a very short time, within a single 
generation, favoring first longer and then shorter hindlimbs. 
The behavioral shift from the ground to higher perches of 
smaller diameter apparently caused this remarkable reversal; 
 
 26. See generally ROBERT VERNE MILLER & MARTIN J. DAY, MICROBIAL EVOLUTION 
(2004). 
 27. See, e.g., Raymond B. Huey, George W. Gilchrist, Margen L. Carlson, David Berrigan 
& Luis Serra, Rapid Evolution of a Geographic Cline in Size in an Introduced Fly, 287 
SCIENCE 308, 308 (2000). 
 28. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Losos, Thomas W. Schoener, R. Brian Langerhans & David A. 
Spiller, Rapid Temporal Reversal in Predator-Driven Natural Selection, 314 SCIENCE 1111, 
1111 (2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
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behavioral flexibility, indeed, may often be the key in driving 
extremely rapid reversals in evolution.
29
  
Evidence also exists for rapid evolution of humans.
30
 ―Evolution 
is the result of accumulated changes in the composition of the gene 
pool.‖31 Biological evolution is genetic change in a lineage of 
organisms over generations.
32
 A genotype is the ―genetic constitution, 
latent or expressed [or] the sum total of all the genes present in an 
individual.‖33 ―Genetic information is encoded in the sequence of 
nucleotides in molecules of DNA, and these, in turn, determine the 
sequence of amino acids in molecules of protein.‖34 A phenotype is 
the ―physical appearance of an organism.‖35 The phenotype of an 
organism ―results from the interaction between the genetic 
constitution (genotype) of the organism and its environment.‖36 
An organism‘s genes encode information used in the synthesis of 
molecules that construct the organism, maintain its various functions, 
and form the physical embodiment of the organism. Biological 
evolution occurs when different gene variants (―alleles‖) change their 
relative frequencies in population of organism over time: 
In natural populations, some alleles increase in frequency from 
generation to generation, and others decrease. (The frequency 
of an allele is simply the proportion of that allele in a 
population in relation to all the alleles of the same gene.) If an 
individual has a favorable combination of alleles in its 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE 
WORLD (2007). This controversial book includes a hypothesis that the population of Britain 
underwent rapid genetic change during and after (and possibly in response to) the Industrial 
Revolution. 
 31. PETER H. RAVEN ET AL., BIOLOGY OF PLANTS 258 (6th ed. 1999). 
 32. A number of scholars have posited the importance of cultural evolution as a 
complement, or sometimes an alternative, to biological evolution. Consider, for example, 
Dawkins‘s theory of the meme. See generally DAWKINS, supra note 17. However, such cultural 
evolution was most likely made possible by underlying biological evolutionary changes, such 
as increases in brain size and complexity. 
 33. RAVEN ET AL., supra note 31, at 231. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 905. 
 36. MARYANN WHITMAN, WILD ONES PHILOSOPHY (2005), http://www.for-wild.org/ 
download/wophilos/wophilos.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009). 
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genotype, it is more likely to survive and reproduce. As a 
consequence, its alleles are likely to be present in an increased 
proportion in the next generation. Conversely, if the 
combination of alleles is not favorable, the individual is less 
likely to survive and reproduce. Representation of its alleles in 
the next generation will be reduced or perhaps eliminated. 
Evolution is the result of such accumulated changes in the gene 
pool over time.
37
 
Genotypic change over time produces phenotypic change over time. 
Evolution does not progress towards any particular goal, 
destination, or end-point (except, in some cases, extinction). 
Evolutionary change proceeds by the ―accumulation of . . . favorable 
variants through time.‖38 Natural selection favors the survival and 
reproduction of those organisms that happen to be better adapted to 
their local environments. However, local environments tend to 
change. This leads to constant adaptation for survival, rather than 
progress: 
If a sequence of local environments could elicit progressive 
advance through time, then some expectation of progress 
might be drawn from natural selection. But no such argument 
seems possible. The sequence of local environments in any one 
place should be effectively random through geological time—
the seas come in and the seas go out, the weather gets colder, 
then hotter, etc. If organisms are tracking local environments 
by natural selection, then their evolutionary history should be 
effectively random as well.  
 These arguments led Darwin to his denial of progress as a 
consequence of the ―bare bones mechanics‖ of natural 
selection—for this process yields only local adaptation, often 
exquisite to be sure, but not universally advancing.
39
 
 
 37. RAVEN ET AL., supra note 31, at 239. 
 38. GOULD, supra note 22, at 138. 
 39. Id. at 139–40. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
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D. Deliberate Evolution 
Evolution by natural selection is not the only form of evolution 
that Charles Darwin observed. In fact, he transposed principles of 
animal and plant breeding, which is known as ―artificial selection,‖ to 
understand how natural selection might function to drive biological 
evolution. Darwin was struck by the rapidity and magnitude of the 
biological change allowed by means of artificial selection: 
We cannot suppose that all the breeds were suddenly produced 
as perfect and as useful as we now see them; indeed, in several 
cases, we know that this has not been their history. The key is 
man‘s power of accumulative selection: nature gives 
successive variations; man adds them up in certain directions 
useful to him. In this sense he may be said to make for himself 
useful breeds. 
 The great power of this principle of selection is not 
hypothetical. It is certain that several of our eminent breeders 
have, even within a single lifetime, modified to . . . a large 
extent some breeds of cattle and sheep.
40
 
Darwin concluded that, to alter genotypes and phenotypes, ―the 
accumulative action of selection . . . is by far the predominant 
power.‖41  
The Tibetan Yak provides a vivid illustration of the fundamental 
changes to an organism‘s biology that artificial selection can make, in 
this case ―artificial selection over the centuries that Tibetans have 
depended on them.‖42 Tibetan yaks have become superbly suited to 
existence in the mountains of Tibet: 
Over the generations, Tibetan yaks have become so adapted to 
high altitudes they suffer poor health under 10,000. Their 
coarse hair, hanging in ragged insulating cascades, combines 
with other features of their physiology to protect them from the 
 
 40. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, in THE WORKS OF CHARLES DARWIN 1, 11 
(Paul H. Barrett & R. B. Freeman eds., New York University Press 1988) (1859). 
 41. Id. at 32. 
 42. PALUMBI, supra note 15, at 178. 
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rigors of the Himalayas. They have immense lungs—three 
times larger than similar-sized cows—to pull oxygen from the 
miserly air. They have less hemoglobin in their red blood cells, 
and indeed fewer red blood cells, than their lowland relatives. 
This thin blood allows for a higher ability to withstand 
temporary dehydration in the dry air and prevents blood cells 
from being forced out of ruptured capillaries by the high blood 
pressure required in high-altitude environments. Even the 
microstructure of their lungs differs. Yaks have thin-walled 
arterioles in their lungs, allowing better transport of oxygen 
into their bloodstream.
43
 
Many of these adaptations are extreme, allowing Tibetan yaks to 
exist in habitats and achieve results their ancestral yaks could not. In 
fact, so extreme are some of their adaptations that Tibetan yaks can 
no longer thrive below high altitudes. 
Humans too have evolved adaptations to their peculiar ecological 
niche. Like the Tibetan yak, many of these adaptations have a genetic 
basis. 
II. HUMAN GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
44
 
A. Genetic Engineering 
Genetic engineering allows the goals of artificial selection to be 
achieved more efficiently than traditional selective breeding 
programs. By inserting genes into the genome of an organism, such 
as a human, traits of that organism could be altered precisely and 
immediately within a single generation. 
Genetic engineering, or recombinant DNA technology, 
encompasses a set of chemical methods by which means the ―genetic 
endowment of organisms can now be precisely changed in designed 
ways.‖45 Genetic engineering ―allows selected individual genes to be 
transferred from one organism into another, including genes from 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. This section is adapted from Torrance, supra note 13, at 1081–91. 
 45. JEREMY M. BERG ET AL., BIOCHEMISTRY 134 (6th ed. 2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
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unrelated species.‖46 Genetic engineering includes transgenics 
(transferring genes from organism to organism), genetic alteration 
(altering genes within the existing genome of an organism), and 
cloning (creating a genetic duplicate of an existing organism, and 
then, optionally, altering the genome of that organism). Although 
genetic engineering has heretofore relied largely upon existing genes, 
advances in the techniques of synthetic biology offer the imminent 
prospect of synthetic genes, and entire genomes, designed and 
synthesized de novo.
47
 
As long as there has been agriculture, humans have deliberately 
modified the genetic material of their crops and livestock through 
selectively breeding for desired genetic traits. Genetic engineering 
―can be used to promote a desirable . . . character or to suppress an 
undesirable trait,‖48 and has allowed genetic modification to be 
achieved more precisely, efficiently, and rapidly than previously 
possible. Genetic engineering allows the creation of high-fidelity 
genetic modifications within a single generation, in contrast to the 
slow rates of progress and low success rates of traditional selective 
breeding techniques. Genetic engineering has already created crops 
with enhanced yields and reduced requirements for agricultural 
inputs, such as nutrients, water, fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides. 
Similar results have been achieved with genetically enhanced 
livestock. 
 
 46. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE USE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION PAPER 5 (2004), available at http://www. 
nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/GM_Crops_Discussion_Paper_2004.pdf.  
 47. See, e.g., Daniel G. Gibson et al., Complete Chemical Synthesis, Assembly, and 
Cloning of a Mycoplasma genitalium Genome, 319 SCIENCE 1215, 1215–20 (2008).  
In fact, this work has already formed the basis for U.S. Patent Application No. 
11/635,355, entitled ―Synthetic Genomes,‖ which claims multiple variations on ―[a] 
method for constructing a synthetic genome,‖ ―[a] synthetic genome,‖ ―[a] method for 
making a synthetic cell,‖ ―[a] synthetic cell,‖ and, most comprehensively, ―A method 
comprising: designing a synthetic genome; constructing the synthetic genome; 
introducing the synthetic genome into a biological system; and expressing the 
synthetic genome.‖ 
Torrance, supra note 13, at 1084–85 n.39, citing U.S. Patent Application 20070264688, 
available at http://patft.uspto.gov (follow ―Quick Search‖ under ―Published Applications‖; then 
search for ―synthetic genomes‖). 
 48. Gibson et al., supra note 47, at 1215–20. 
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Golden Rice illustrates the great promise and power of genetic 
engineering to enhance the genetic traits of organisms. Although rice 
is the major source of calories for much of the world‘s population,49 
its grains lack a nutrient vital to human health: beta-carotene. A 
biological problem precluded the use of traditional genetic 
techniques: Since beta-carotene is not produced in the rice endosperm 
(that is, the edible tissue of rice),
50
 traditional selective breeding was 
not an option. Rather, two plant biologists, Potrykus and Beyer, 
realized that genetic engineering was necessary to introduce genetic 
traits where they previously did not exist. 
Potrykus and Beyer discovered that the addition of two transgenes 
(that is, genes from organisms other than rice) to the rice genome led 
to the production of beta-carotene in the endosperm: 
The first transgene encodes phytoene synthase (PSY), which 
utilises the endogenously synthesized geranylgeranyl-
diphosphate to form phytoene, a colorless carotene with a 
triene chromophore. The second encodes a bacterial carotene 
desaturase (CRTI) that introduces conjugation by adding four 
double bonds. The combined activity of PSY and CRTI leads 
to the formation of lycopene, which is a red compound due to 
its undecaene chromophore.
51
 
With the addition of these transgenes, rice endosperm is able to 
produce beta-carotene in significant amounts.
52
 Although the first 
generation of Golden Rice contained a PSY gene derived from 
daffodil and a CRTI gene derived from a bacterium, Erwinia 
uredovora, much greater amounts of beta-carotene were later 
achieved by inserting a PSY gene from maize.
53
 By 2005, the Golden 
Rice genetically engineered by Potrykus and Beyer was capable of 
producing sufficient beta-carotene to meet even the ambitious 
 
 49. GOLDEN RICE, HUMANITARIAN BOARD, THE SCIENCE BEHIND GOLDEN RICE (2007), 
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how1_sci.html. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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recommended daily allowances for children in rich, developed 
countries.
54
 
Golden Rice sets into high relief a crucial difference between 
traditional selective breeding for genetic traits, on one hand, and 
genetic engineering, on the other. The former can only yield 
organisms with heritable traits amplified from existing genes, and can 
only do so over multiple generations; where there is no genetic basis 
for a trait, that gene-based trait cannot be bred. Genetic engineering, 
by contrast, can create organisms with gene-based traits in organisms 
with no genetic basis for such traits, and can do so within a single 
generation. 
B. Genetic Engineering of Humans 
Though useful and widespread for more than thirty years as a 
technique for adding genetic traits to nonhuman organisms, genetic 
engineering was, until a decade ago, inapplicable to humans 
themselves. Even its successful application to a variety of fellow 
mammals did not justify its use in humans, largely for ethical 
reasons. As Lee Silver, a geneticist at Princeton University, explains, 
[s]ince the 1980s, genetic engineering has been practiced with 
success in animals like mice, cows, sheep, and pigs. But it has 
yet to be applied to human beings for one simple reason—it is 
incredibly inefficient. With the simplest technique for adding 
genes to embryos, the success rate is 50 percent at best, and 
this is accompanied by a 5 percent risk of inducing disease-
causing mutations in the animal that is born. That‘s not a 
problem for animal geneticists—who can choose the one 
healthy animal with a desired genetic modification from 
among a litter or flock—but it is unacceptable for use with 
humans. And with more sophisticated techniques of gene 
alteration, the problem just gets worse, with only one cell in a 
million likely to be altered in the correct way.
55
  
 
 54. Id. 
 55. SILVER, supra note 2, at 152. 
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However, the discovery of mammalian cloning has made genetic 
engineering much more feasible in humans by removing a number of 
the pre-cloning technical hurdles. Silver continues: 
With such a low rate of success, the direct engineering of 
genes within an isolated human embryo—destined to be a 
child—is not something that anyone would try or accept. But 
with cloning, the entire equation changes. Now, multiple cells 
grown from a single embryo could be subjected to genetic 
engineering. With protocols already available today [in 1998], 
those that appear to be engineered as desired could be 
recognized and picked out. Each single selected cell could be 
expanded by itself into a clone of cells that provides sufficient 
material for the confirmation of genetic integrity. Then, and 
only then, would one cell from this mass of cells be used by 
means of nuclear transformation to produce a new embryo, 
which would develop into a new human being, with a special 
genetic gift. Incredibly, within five months of the 
announcement of Dolly‘s birth, on July 25, 1997, the same 
team of Scottish scientists announced that they had 
successfully carried out this very protocol with the birth of 
several lambs carrying a foreign human gene. It is in the very 
same manner—when the techniques of cloning and genetic 
engineering are combined—that the human species will gain 
control over its own destiny.
56
 
Since the birth of Dolly, ethical concerns have shifted, to focus less 
on rates of success for genetic engineering than on whether or not 
humans should be genetically engineered at all. The ability of human 
parents to select genetic traits for their children is now more a 
question of when rather than if. 
C. Genetic Enhancement of Humans 
Humans have always welcomed enhancements to their capacities, 
including those made possible by new technology. As Henry T. 
Greely points out, 
 
 56. Id. 
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[t]he story of humanity is the history of enhancement. Stone 
tools, control of fire, and clothing all enhanced the success of 
hunter gatherers. Agriculture enhanced food supply and 
population size and made possible the specialization of labor. 
Writing systems enhanced our ability to communicate, among 
people and across time, and strengthened our memories; 
printing reduced the costs of mass distribution of information. 
Metallurgy and engineering, electricity and computers have all 
increased what humans can do and what we can be.
57
 
An often controversial category of enhancement is biological 
enhancement.
58
 Biological enhancements ―increase our abilities by 
enhancing our biological selves through new technical inventions.‖59 
Examples of biological enhancement include plastic surgery that 
increases a recipient‘s physical attractiveness, caffeine that improves 
a recipient‘s ability to study late into the night, and anabolic steroids 
that accelerate a recipient‘s ability to acquire muscle mass. 
While biological enhancement is controversial, genetic 
enhancement is especially so. Many people consider genetic 
engineering to enhance human beings unethical, immoral, or both. 
However, the human desire to improve is strong, and the desire to 
improve one‘s children permanently is an extremely powerful force. 
The capacity that somatic nuclear transfer, or cloning, has for genetic 
enhancement of one‘s offspring will be highly attractive to many 
parents. Parents, who tend to be especially fond of providing their 
children with advantages, will be especially interested in making such 
enhancements permanent by engineering them into their offspring. 
Lee Silver offers the following prediction: 
Genetic engineering will eventually be used by future 
reprogeneticists. It will begin in a way that is most ethically 
acceptable to the largest portion of society, with the treatment 
of only those childhood diseases—like sickle cell anemia or 
cystic fibrosis—that have a severe impact on quality of life. 
 
 57. Greely, supra note 1, at 88. 
 58. See generally id.  
 59. Id. at 88. 
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The number of parents who will desire this service will be tiny, 
but their experience will help to ease society‘s trepidation. 
 As the fear begins to subside, reprogeneticists will expand 
their services to nullify mutations that have a less severe 
impact on a child, or an impact delayed until childhood. 
Predisposition to obesity, diabetes, heart disease, asthma, and 
various forms of cancer all fall into this category. And as the 
technology spreads, its range will be extended to the addition 
of new genes that serve as genetic inoculations against various 
infectious agents, including the HIV virus that causes AIDS. 
At the same time, other genes will be added to improve various 
health characteristics and disease resistance in children who 
would not otherwise have been born with any particular 
problem. 
 The final frontier will be the mind and the senses. Alcohol 
addiction will be eliminated, along with tendencies toward 
mental disease and antisocial behavior like extreme aggression. 
Visual and auditory acuity will be enhanced in some to 
improve artistic potential. And when our understanding of the 
genetic input into brain development has advanced, 
reprogeneticists will provide parents with the option of 
enhancing various cognitive attributes as well. . . . 
 In the short term . . . most genetic enhancements will surely 
be much more mundane [than potentially extraordinary 
enhancements]. They will provide little fixes to all of the 
naturally occurring genetic defects that shorten the lives of so 
many people. They will enrich physical and cognitive 
attributes in small ways. And as the years go by over the next 
two centuries, the number and variety of possible genetic 
extensions to the basic human genome will rise 
exponentially—like the additions to computer operating 
systems that occurred during the 1980s and 90s. Extensions 
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that were once unimaginable will become indispensable . . . to 
those parents who are able to afford them.
60
 
Lee Silver envisions that the availability of genetic enhancement will 
have great effects on society. In fact, he predicts the emergence of a 
social, political, economic, and even reproductive barrier between the 
genetically enhanced (―GenRich‖) and those without genetic 
enhancements (―Naturals‖): 
[A] difference has emerged [among humans] that is sharp and 
easily defined. It is the difference between those who are 
genetically enhanced and those who are not. The GenRich . . . 
all carry synthetic genes. Genes that were created in the 
laboratory and did not exist within the human species until 
twenty-first century reproductive geneticists began to put them 
there. The GenRich are a [future] hereditary class of genetic 
aristocrats.
61
  
The future course of human genetic enhancement is unlikely to 
lead to a scenario exactly like that proposed by Lee Silver. 
Nevertheless, it is highly probable that genetic enhancement of some 
kind—whether narrow in scope and relatively uncontroversial in 
nature, such as ameliorating genetic diseases, or broader in scope and 
more controversial, such as expanding the potential abilities of 
humans beyond their non-genetically enhanced baselines—will occur 
in the near future. 
Humans have attempted to enhance themselves for millennia. 
Enhancement is an unsurprising and rational goal because it confers, 
or is perceived to confer, advantages. Becoming faster, stronger, 
healthier, more attractive, or cleverer are all obvious temptations, 
especially in a society where competition can decide who receives 
scarce resources such as acceptance to prestigious schools, academic 
scholarships and awards, remunerative jobs, high social status, 
financial prestige, and desirable mates. Existing individuals might 
wish such enhancements for themselves, though successfully 
conferring genetic traits that might undergird such enhancements 
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 61. Id. at 5. 
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would be technologically difficult. However, enhancing one‘s 
children would be far more feasible, even with existing 
biotechnology, since enhancing genes could be introduced into 
embryos early enough to ensure that all subsequent cells carry the 
enhanced genotype. 
Parents will often make extreme efforts to ensure the success of 
their children, sometimes even sacrificing themselves in favor of their 
offspring‘s survival. If genetic enhancement were to raise the 
probability that their children might thrive in a highly competitive 
world, at least some, and probably many, parents would be willing to 
choose genetic enhancement for their children. Furthermore, if some 
parents chose to enhance their offspring, other parents, who might 
otherwise have opted not to enhance, would feel pressure to ensure 
that their own offspring did not begin life at a genetic disadvantage 
relative to the genetically enhanced children of other parents. 
In the language of evolutionary biology, the strategy of not 
enhancing one‘s offspring while others enhance their offspring might 
be an unstable strategy. The societal implications could also be 
destabilizing. Philosopher Jürgen Habermas has observed that genetic 
enhancement of some but not others might threaten ―the essentially 
symmetrical relations between free and equal human beings.‖62 
However, in the likely absence of governmental intervention in 
reproductive decision-making, parents will perform the fearful 
calculus about whether or not to attempt to enhance their children 
genetically. Michael Sandel explains the stark choice that may face 
parents: 
Pointing to the possible effects of bioengineering on humility, 
responsibility, and solidarity may be persuasive to those who 
prize those virtues. But those who care more about gaining a 
competitive edge for their children or themselves may decide 
that the benefits to be gained from genetic enhancement 
outweigh its allegedly adverse effects on social institutions and 
moral sentiments.
63
 
 
 62. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN NATURE 23 (2003). 
 63. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF 
GENETIC ENGINEERING 95 (2007). 
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Human genetic enhancement will almost certainly become a 
technological reality in the near future, and it is vital to consider how 
the law will regulate access to it. Currently, although drug regulation 
laws may police the safety and efficacy of genetic enhancements 
intended for the market, it is the patent system that will largely 
determine who gains access to those genetic enhancements that are 
approved. 
III. PATENTS AND GENETIC ENHANCEMENT
64
 
A. The Patent System 
The Patent Act
65
 requires patent applications to satisfy several 
statutory requirements before they can become patents. Beyond a 
number of procedural requirements, there are several substantive 
requirements, principally those of novelty,
66
 nonobviousness,
67
 
utility,
68
 disclosure,
69
 and claims.
70
 
Patents are expensive and take a long time to obtain. On average, 
an applicant for a patent pertaining to a complex technology will 
spend more than eleven thousand dollars simply to file a patent 
application,
71
 and, after filing, considerably more to obtain 
enforceable patent rights.
72
 The examination system of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (―USPTO‖), the agency where 
patent applications are examined by technically skilled examiners 
before a patent can issue, acts relatively slowly. Patent prosecution 
 
 64. This section is adapted from Torrance, supra note 13, at 1091–1101. 
 65. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-2071 (2006). 
 66. Id. § 102. 
 67. Id. § 103. 
 68. Id. § 101. 
 69. Id. § 112. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent that Holds Up 
in Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 2006, at 515 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and 
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 9001, 2006) (―For example, based on the 
AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005, the average expected charge in 2004 for 
preparing and filing a utility patent application was $11,218 for a relatively complex electrical 
or computer application and $12,373 for a relatively complex biotechnology/chemical 
application.‖). 
 72. Interview with Craig Smith, Partner, Fish & Richardson P.C. (Mar. 5, 2007). 
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(the process through which a patent application must pass prior to 
issuance as a patent) generally takes from two-and-a-half to five 
years,
73
 with the duration of prosecution rising with the complexity of 
the technology involved. 
Once a patent is actually issued by the USPTO, the term of a 
patent is almost always significantly less than the theoretical twenty-
year term because of time spent in patent prosecution or regulatory 
approval. Even with patent-term extension to compensate for 
unreasonable federal agency review, the average enforceable lifetime 
of a patent lasts only about fifteen to seventeen-and-a-half years. If a 
patent owner decides to enforce the right to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented 
invention, the average cost of patent litigation can rise above $5 
million, depending on the amount of damages at issue.
74
 
Additionally, patent litigation involves a significant degree of 
unpredictability, at least in part due to the proliferation of judicial 
barriers and available defenses to patent infringement.
75
 
 
 73. Id. The USPTO Performance Report for fiscal year 2006 reports an average patent 
pendency time (defined as time from filing until patent issued or application abandoned by 
applicant) of 31.1 months and shows that this figure has been increasing over the past few 
years. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 22 (2006), available at http://www.uspto. 
gov/web/offices/com/annual/2006/2006annualreport.pdf. However, the average pendency times 
estimated by the USPTO are likely underestimates. Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, 
and Express Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 119, 130 (2005) (―[T]he average prosecution (or pendency) time for an 
ultimately successful patent is 3.6 years, with a median of 2.7 years. Anecdotally, the time 
period . . . varies by technology and ranges from twenty-four to thirty-six months for chemical 
and mechanical arts and thirty-six to sixty months for electrical and software arts‖ (footnote 
omitted)). 
 74. Fiala & Wright, supra note 71, at 522. 
In comparison, the average estimated costs associated with litigating a patent in 2005 
as reported by [AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005] were: $769,562 for a 
patent infringement suit in which less than $1 million was at risk; $2,637,179 for a suit 
in which between $1 and $25 million was at risk; and $5,175,753 for a suit in which 
more than $25 million was at risk. 
Id. 
 75. See David J.F. Gross & Shawn T. Gordon, Claim Construction, Patent Infringement, 
and the Growing Importance of the Claim Vitiation Defense, in PATENT LITIGATION 2005, at 
45, 51 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Court Handbook Series No. 
6578, 2005) (―[T]he Federal Circuit has erected several independent barriers to finding 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, but the most foreboding of such barriers may be 
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Patent rights have attracted an increasing amount of controversy 
from the public in recent years. This is especially true where gene 
patents are concerned. This controversy is one of the factors that has 
led to suggestions about open source biology as an alternative 
approach. 
B. The Patent Quid Pro Quo 
Among the rights a patent confers to the patent owner is the right 
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or 
importing the claimed invention during the term of the patent, or 
from inducing or contributing to such infringement.
76
 The patent term 
is twenty years from the filing date of the patent application.
77
 In 
return for the limited monopoly right to exclude, an inventor must 
provide the public with a full disclosure of the claimed invention.
78
 
According to 35 U.S.C. § 112, a patent applicant must provide a 
detailed and explanatory disclosure of the claimed invention: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using 
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out his invention.
79
 
This disclosure requirement is often conceived as part of a bargain 
between inventor and society. In return for monopoly rights to 
exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the 
 
the doctrine of claim vitiation.‖); Douglas R. Nemec, Current Trends in Equitable Defenses to 
Patent Infringement: Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct, in PATENT LITIGATION 
2004, at 1147, 1155 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Court 
Handbook Series No. 3149, 2004) (―This article . . . compares several recent Federal Circuit 
decisions on inequitable conduct, and explores how these cases, together with Symbol 
Technologies, suggest an inclination by the Federal Circuit toward more vigorous policing and 
enforcement of the rules of conduct before the PTO.‖). 
 76. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a)–(b) (2006). 
 77. Id. § 154(a)(2). 
 78. Id. § 112. 
 79. Id. 
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patented invention within the United States, or importing the patented 
invention into the United States,
80
 the patentee contributes new 
information to the metaphorical public storehouse of knowledge. 
Although information about how to practice the claims is of limited 
immediate usefulness in the face of the patent owner‘s right to 
exclude others during the term of a patent, the teachings in a patent 
do provide society with new knowledge or techniques. These new 
teachings may help other inventors to develop other, unrelated 
inventions, improvements on the claimed invention, or noninfringing 
alternatives that directly compete with the claimed invention.
81
 In 
addition, once the patent term expires, so does the patent owner‘s 
right to exclude others from freely practicing the claimed invention.
82
 
The disclosure requirement functions to assist in ensuring the fairness 
of the bargain made between inventor and society by ensuring that 
the public storehouse of knowledge receives reliable, new 
information
83
 to justify toleration of the deadweight loss to society 
caused by the patent owner‘s monopoly exclusion right. As the 
Supreme Court has pronounced, the disclosure requirement is ―the 
quid pro quo of the right to exclude.‖84 
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 outlines the disclosure 
requirement.
85
 An applicant for a patent must provide ―a written 
description of the invention.‖86 This disclosure requirement has 
several purposes. First, it serves a notice function, by providing the 
public with a specific indication of what the inventor considers to be 
his or her invention. Second, the disclosure requirement represents 
the very core of the patent bargain and is ―arguably the most 
 
 80. Id. §§ 154(a)(2), 271(a)–(b). 
 81. Note that these informational amenities all lessen the deadweight loss to society 
incurred by the monopoly exclusion rights conferred by the patent grant. 
 82. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (―[The patent] grant shall be for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for 
the patent was filed in the United States.‖). 
 83. Patent applications are published within about eighteen months of filing. Id. 
§ 122(b)(1)(A) (―[E]ach application shall be published . . . promptly after the expiration of a 
period of [eighteen] months from the earliest filing date.‖).  
 84. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) 
(quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)). 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 86. Id. 
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important patent doctrine after obviousness.‖87 It is crucial for 
ensuring that society receives an adequate description of inventions 
in exchange for tolerating the monopoly right to exclude others 
granted to inventors.
88
 One of the paramount purposes of the 
disclosure requirement is 
to provide the assurance that the public will, in fact, receive 
something in return for the patent grant. This consideration is, 
of course, the full and complete disclosure of how to make and 
use the claimed invention. Thus, the patent adds a measure of 
worthwhile knowledge to the public storehouse. The incentive 
to give this added measure of knowledge to the public, which 
clearly promotes the progress of the ―Useful Arts,‖ is the 
primary justification for the existence of the patent system.
89
 
A patent application claiming a new gene (or any other invention) 
must disclose ―the manner and process of making and using it, in 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same.‖90 Furthermore, as explained in 
In re Wright, 
[a]lthough not explicitly stated in section 112, to be enabling, 
the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art 
how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention 
without ―undue experimentation.‖91 
C. Promoting Progress in the Useful Arts 
Legal authority for a patent system is provided by the United 
States Constitution. Specifically, Article I, Section 8, clause 8 states 
that ―The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of 
 
 87. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Radar, J., 
dissenting) (addressing the enablement requirement). 
 88. In economic terms, the enablement requirement, along with the written description 
and best mode requirements, may be viewed as attempts to minimize the deadweight loss to 
society attending the monopoly right conferred by a patent. 
 89. In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
 90. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 91. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.‖92 Congress has relied on this explicit constitutional 
authority to offer statutory patent protection for inventions since the 
original Patent Act of 1790.
93
 
―[T]o promote progress of science and the useful arts,‖ the 
availability of patent protection provides an incentive for inventors to 
invest their valuable time and efforts on the development of 
technological innovations. By virtue of the monopoly right that a 
patent confers, investments in developing new and useful 
compositions, devices, and methods have an opportunity of yielding 
profits because inventors can exclude all others from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing their inventions for a substantial 
period of time. A particular advantage of this incentive system is that 
Congress need not offer inventors financial rewards for new 
inventions because, based on the right to exclude others, patent 
owners can directly extract monopoly rents from consumers wishing 
to make or use patented inventions. The monopoly pricing that the 
patent system allows does inflict a deadweight loss on society. 
However, the monopoly endures only for a limited period of time 
(that is, twenty years from the filing date of a utility patent or Patent 
Cooperation Treaty application), after which the right to exclude 
others is lost, and competition can drive down prices. Counteracting 
the deadweight loss to society, the disclosure of a patent application 
delivers informational benefits to society as soon as it is published 
(that is, usually about eighteen months following the patent 
application‘s priority date).94 
The patent system is commonly assumed to promote scientific and 
technological progress.
95
 By conferring to inventors a limited 
monopoly right to exclude, the patent system should create incentives 
for scientific technical innovation additional to those incentives that 
would exist in the absence of available patent protection. The United 
 
 92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 93. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
 94. See supra note 83. 
 95. Here, ―scientific‖ and ―technical‖ are intended to be interpreted broadly to include all 
fields entitled to patent protection, including biological, chemical, physical, electrical, 
mechanical, software, athletic, business, and financial innovations. 
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States Constitution explicitly recognizes that the goal of the patent 
system is ―[t]o promote the progress of . . . useful arts.‖96 In theory, 
potential inventors will respond to the incentive created by the patent 
system by choosing to allocate more time, energy, and other 
resources into inventing ―any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof‖97 than would otherwise be the case. 
The hypothesis that the patent system spurs innovation 
(hereinafter, the ―Innovation Hypothesis‖) has been tested by a 
number of different approaches by both economists and legal 
thinkers. Some of these have established theoretical frameworks to 
explain why the patent system should promote innovation. Others 
have attempted to estimate the additional quantum of innovation 
created by the availability of patent protection by using a number of 
distinct approaches: designing mathematical models of technological 
innovation; attempting directly to measure levels of innovation in a 
single economy; and comparing rates of innovation between 
countries offering strong patent protection and countries offering 
weak, or no, patent protection. Still others have questioned the basic 
assumption that the patent system does indeed promote innovation, 
suggesting, instead, that patents may lead to fewer inventions, at least 
under certain circumstances. Thus far, there is surprisingly little clear 
evidence that patent systems promote innovation. 
The introduction to Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy,
98
 a 
2003 publication of the National Academies Press, discusses recent 
work addressing whether the theory is valid: ―There are theoretical as 
well as empirical reasons to question whether patent rights advance 
innovation in a substantial way in most industries.‖99 For example, 
the benefit of the patent monopoly might be outweighed by the cost 
of the disclosure the patent system requires,
100
 and ―where 
technological advances build upon one another cumulatively, as is 
 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 98. PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. 
Merrill eds., 2003). 
 99. Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill, Introduction, in PATENTS IN THE 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 1, 2 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
 100. Id.  
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increasingly the case, broad patent protection on upstream 
discoveries may slow the rate of technical change by impeding 
subsequent innovations.‖101 On the whole, the authors argue, the 
―literature on the impact of patents on innovation must be considered 
emergent.‖102 There has been ―little systematic empirical analysis of 
the impact of patents on innovation.‖103 One reason for this is limited 
data in some areas; another is that ―the effect of patent policy has 
many dimensions‖ and it has therefore been challenging to determine 
how a particular policy actually affects innovation.
104
 
Mazzoleni and Nelson provide a useful framework for organizing 
theories about the patent system. They suggest that the answer to the 
question, ―What are the social benefits and costs of awarding patents 
for inventions?‖ is not simple or well settled, though ―[m]any 
economists and patent lawyers seem to think‖ that it is.105 They 
propose four broad theories about the purposes served by patents: 
1. The anticipation of patents provides motivation for useful 
invention: we will call this the ―invention motivation‖ theory. 
2. Patents induce inventors to ―disclose‖ their inventions when 
otherwise they would rely on secrecy, and in this and other 
ways facilitate wide knowledge about and use of inventions: 
we will call this the ―invention dissemination‖ theory. 
3. Patents on inventions induce the needed investments to 
develop and commercialize them: this we call the ―induce 
commercialization‖ theory. 
4. Patents enable the orderly exploration of broad prospects: 
we call this the ―exploration control‖ theory.106 
The authors recognize that these purposes are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and may overlap, but some versions of the 
theories do conflict. The first three theories have a long history, 
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whereas the fourth theory is of relatively recent vintage.
107
 The 
authors also make the useful observation that theories about the costs 
and benefits of patents are often based on assumptions (not always 
explicit) about certain ―context conditions‖: 
1. The nature and effectiveness of means other than patents to 
induce invention and related activities. These ―other means‖ 
may be as diverse as government grants and contracts or strong 
first mover advantages. 
2. Whether the group of potential inventors is likely to work 
on diverse and non-competing ideas, or whether the group is 
likely to be focused on a single alternative or a set of closely 
connected ones. Basically the issue here is whether or not more 
inventing input yields more useful inventing output or mainly 
duplication of effort and waste. 
3. The deterrent effect of the presence of patents on 
unauthorized use of a technology and on the transaction costs 
involved in licensing an invention. 
4. Whether the multiple steps in the invention, development, 
and commercialization of a new technology tend to proceed 
efficiently within a single organization, or whether efficiency 
is enhanced if different organizations are involved at different 
stages of the process. 
5. What we will call the topography of technological advance, 
by which we mean the manner in which inventions are linked 
to each other temporally, and as systems in use. 
 At least some of these conditions are partly endogenous to 
the nature of the patent system. They are themselves 
influenced by the strength and scope of the patent protection 
within a field of technology. . . .  
 . . . In any case, the implications of the theories are very 
sensitive to the assumed context conditions.
108
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Later, they make the point that different theories probably apply in 
different domains: ―The proposition we now want strongly to espouse 
is that the appropriate question about these diverse theories is not 
‗Which theory is the correct one?‘ but rather, ‗Where do the different 
theories apply?‘‖109 The empirical work necessary to answer this 
question has not yet been done. 
Numerous other approaches have been taken to analyze the 
question of what effects patents have on promoting or retarding 
innovation. For example, Landes and Posner suggest a theoretical 
approach that incorporates insights from other forms of intellectual 
property law: ―[A] more illuminating way of thinking about the 
patent system is as a response to economic problems inherent in trade 
secrecy and market structure.‖110 Much more work will be required 
before stronger causal links can be drawn between patents and 
innovation. In the meantime, existing empirical evidence does not 
demonstrate the patent system to be superior to open source 
approaches at generating innovation in general. The relationship 
between patents and genetic innovation, however, may be an 
exception. 
D. Promoting Progress in the Genetic Arts 
In 1998, Heller and Eisenberg raised the specter that patents 
claiming genes risked causing a ―tragedy of the anticommons‖: 
[T]he recent proliferation of intellectual property rights in 
biomedical research suggests . . . an ―anticommons‖ in which 
people underuse scarce resources because too many owners 
can block each other. . . . [Unless privatization of biomedical 
research is managed properly,] more intellectual property 
rights may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for 
improving human health.
111
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Heller and Eisenberg envisioned a particular risk of incurring a 
tragedy of the anticommons with respect to patents claiming genes, 
fragments thereof, or polypeptides.
112
 Without careful limitation of 
patents on such categories of inventions, Heller and Eisenberg feared 
the creation of ―a tragedy of the anticommons through a proliferation 
of fragmented and overlapping intellectual property rights.‖113 
Subsequently, others have also suggested that patents claiming genes 
might inhibit, rather than promote, genetic innovation.
114
 
However, a tragedy of the anticommons in gene patents has been 
difficult to substantiate. To the contrary, the best available evidence 
appears to discount its existence. Caulfield et al. have summarized 
the evidence: 
The results of [surveyed] empirical efforts have been fairly 
consistent. First, the effects predicted by the anticommons 
problem are not borne out in the available data. The effects are 
much less prevalent than would be expected if its hypothesized 
mechanisms were in fact operating. The data do show a large 
number of patents associated with genes. A recent study found 
that nearly 20% of human genes were associated with at least 
one US patent, and many had multiple patents. Another study 
estimated that in the United States over 3,000 new DNA-
related patents have issued every year since 1998, and more 
than 40,000 such patents have been granted. But despite the 
large number of patents and the numerous, heterogeneous 
actors—including large pharmaceutical firms, biotech startups, 
universities and governments—studies that have examined the 
incidence of anticommons problems find them relatively 
uncommon. These studies span both academics and industry, 
and include data from the United States, Germany, Australia 
and Japan.
115
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As the authors conclude, ―although there may have been good 
reasons for concern, the feared problems [predicted to be caused by 
the tragedy of the anticommons] have not widely manifested.‖116 
Similarly, a recent comprehensive survey of human gene patent 
litigation in United States courts concludes that gene patents have not 
caused a tragedy of the anticommons in the United States.
117
 
In their recent study of the role that the patent system plays in 
spurring innovation, James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer suggest the 
patent system may indeed promote innovation in the 
pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry.
118
 As they have stated, ―The 
evidence is certainly consistent with the notion that patents encourage 
American pharmaceutical‖ research and development.119 
E. Exclusion from Genetic Enhancement 
By conferring on their owners the right to exclude parents from 
access to genes that could enhance their children, gene patents have 
powerful implications for the distribution of genetic enhancement 
within society. In essence, the right to exclude may bar at least some 
parents from the opportunity to genetically enhance their children. 
Like more conventional drugs and other medicines, access to genetic 
enhancements would likely be mediated through pricing mechanisms. 
The more valuable the enhancement a gene offered, the more 
expensive access to that gene would be for parents eager to ensure the 
best genes for their children. 
It is true that the right to exclude tends to last for only twenty 
years from the filing date of the patent application, resulting in free 
access to any gene after its corresponding patent expires. However, 
just as with other rapidly advancing fields of technology, genetic 
enhancements too will surely improve rapidly over time. As a 
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consequence of such advances, a genetic enhancement that was once 
cutting-edge may become obsolete, or even positively deleterious, by 
the time its patent protection expires. In fact, it would be unsurprising 
if improvements in genetic enhancement advanced, at least in part, in 
order to surmount prevailing levels of genetic enhancement; a genetic 
enhancement shared by many or all depreciates any relative 
advantage conferred by that enhancement. One might even expect a 
sort of genetic-enhancement arms race to ensue, with those able to 
afford doing so opting to arm their children with the latest and 
greatest genetic enhancements to maintain their advantages over 
children with no, or lesser, genetic enhancements. 
It is not difficult to imagine how the patent system could assist in 
achieving a division between GenRich and Naturals. In fact, by its 
mediation of access to genetic enhancements, patent law holds the 
potential to affect the future course of human evolution. Patent law 
could act as a direct force for differentiating genetically enhanced 
humans from those lacking genetic enhancements via two distinct 
mechanisms: (1) creating an incentive to discover, synthesize, and 
develop new genetic enhancements; and (2) by limiting access to 
those genetic enhancements. 
IV. OPEN SOURCE AND GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
A. Open Source Biology 
Open source biology offers an alternative approach to the 
proprietary model of biomedical research that currently predominates 
in the United States and many other countries. The origins of open 
source, however, are found within the arena of computer software. 
Open source software is ―computer source code publicly available for 
licensees to use, modify, and redistribute, provided that these 
licensees make their enhancements available to others on the same 
terms.‖120 More specifically, to be considered open source by the 
Open Source Initiative, an organization viewed by many as a 
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guardian of the open source movement, a particular set of software 
code must be made available under a license that satisfies the Open 
Source Definition (―OSD‖).121 The OSD includes requirements such 
as free redistribution, availability of source code, free redistribution 
of derivative works, non-discrimination against potential users or 
fields of use, and technology neutrality.
122
 Steven Weber has 
articulated a simpler, tripartite definition: (1) ―Source code must be 
distributed with the software or otherwise made available for no more 
than the cost of distribution‖; (2) ―[a]nyone may redistribute the 
software for free, without royalties or licensing fees to the author‖; 
and (3) ―[a]nyone may modify the software or derive other software 
from it, and then redistribute the modified software under the same 
terms.‖123 There have been a number of notable successes in open 
source software, including the Linux operating system, the Apache 
web-server, and the mySQL database system.
124
 
In the realm of biology, the success of open source as a viable 
challenger to the existing, proprietary model of research and 
development remains unproven. Nevertheless, several initiatives are 
seeking to demonstrate the power of the open source biological 
approach. Richard Jefferson has been a pioneer in developing an 
open source system for research and development in biology. For 
example, his institution, CAMBIA, offers a number of technology 
platforms designed to make the genetic modification of crops easier, 
while minimizing risks of infringing existing patents.
125
 Furthermore, 
CAMBIA‘s Biological Innovation for Open Society (―BiOS‖) 
initiative seeks to replicate the success of open source software in 
biology: ―Similar to the ethos of the Free Software movement, the 
BiOS Initiative is not about cheap or free stuff, either 
pharmaceuticals or food. It‘s about creating the freedom to innovate 
based on what has come before, and the freedom to deliver the fruits 
of such innovation with few constraints.‖126 Another open source 
 
 121. Open Source Initiative Homepage, supra note 8. 
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initiative, the International HapMap Project (―IHMP‖), is a 
―partnership of scientists and funding agencies from Canada, China, 
Japan, Nigeria, the United Kingdom and the United States to develop 
a public resource that will help researchers find genes associated with 
human disease and response to pharmaceuticals.‖127 The HapMap (or 
map of haplotypes) ―is a catalog of common genetic variants that 
occur in human beings.‖128 One of IHMP‘s major goals is to avoid 
the development of a patent thicket in haplotype research. Instead of 
patenting the haplotypes they discover, IHMP participants contribute 
their data to the IHMP genetic database; ―[b]y making this 
information freely available, the [IHMP] will help biomedical 
researchers find genes involved in disease and responses to 
therapeutic drugs.‖129 Rather than require licenses for access to its 
database, ―[d]ata generated by the [IHMP] can be downloaded with 
minimal constraints.‖130 However, the IHMP does not oppose patent 
applications on genes shown to possess specific utility ―as long as 
this action does not prevent others from obtaining access to data from 
the [IHMP].‖131 
The Tropical Diseases Initiative (―TDI‖) has proposed an open 
source biology model to promote innovation in treatments for tropical 
diseases that disproportionately affect people in the developing 
world.
132
 Despite the devastation such diseases cause among people 
in some of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world, 
few drugs are developed to treat these diseases.
133
 Even so, 
proponents of the TDI have acknowledged the role of the patent 
system in promoting innovation in biomedical research, noting that 
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―patent incentives and commercial pharmaceutical houses have made 
Western health care the envy of the world.‖134 These proponents have 
also noted that ―[t]o date, open-source methods have made little 
headway beyond software.‖135 
On a superficial level, open source may appear to be especially 
relevant to inventions like genes. Genes, like software code, are built 
from a definable vocabulary of commands that, once executed, 
produce some result. The genetic vocabulary of commands consists 
of the deoxyribonucleotides, A, T, G, and C, and the results are the 
synthesis of ribonucleic acids (―RNA‖) or polypeptides (which form 
proteins). Genes may be discovered, isolated, and altered. Genes and 
artificial chromosomes may also be designed synthetically. In fact, 
just as blocks of software code for carrying out particular functions 
are freely available, the ―Registry of Standard Biological Parts‖ 
makes ―BioBricks,‖ or biological molecules, available to those 
conducting biological research or engineering projects.
136
 While it is 
true that many have the requisite knowledge and skill to isolate, 
sequence, manipulate, and even synthesize genes, acquiring these 
requisites and securing access to the considerable facilities and 
resources needed to accomplish successful genetic engineering makes 
the prospect of achieving a viable system of open source genetics 
much more challenging than the comparable model that exists for 
open source software. 
B. Limitations of Open Source Biology 
To design and write software code, one need only have 
knowledge, skill, and access to a computer. To isolate, sequence, 
design, or synthesize genes, one needs knowledge, skill, access to 
expensive equipment, expensive supplies (for example, chemical 
reagents), and expensive technical personnel. Genetic research is 
orders of magnitude more expensive than software coding. The 
romantic image of a lone software coder coming up with an 
 
 134. Maurer, Rai & Sali, supra note 7, at 183. 
 135. Id. at 184. 
 136. See Registry of Standard Biological Parts Main Page, http://partsregistry.org/ Main_ 
Page (last visited Mar. 2, 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Open Source Human Evolution 129 
 
 
important new hack may not translate well to the world of biological 
research. Biological knowledge and skill are uniquely difficult to 
develop. One must not only study theory, but learn practical skills in 
a well appointed molecular biology laboratory. Carrying out 
laborious, time-consuming, and often unsuccessful experiments is a 
sine qua non of attaining a solid basis in genetics. 
There are significant barriers to entry into such laboratories. 
Access is usually reserved for students formally studying biology, 
professional biologists who have already attained a recognized 
academic degree (for example, Ph.D. or M.D.), and skilled laboratory 
technicians. Laboratories are usually quite conscious of security for 
several reasons: laboratories often view themselves as in competition 
with other laboratories to be the first to publish important new 
discoveries, which can be an important factor in career success; 
confidentiality is necessary to preserve patent rights prior to the filing 
of a patent application, which is widely viewed within academia and 
industry as a potential, though admittedly uncommon, path to riches; 
laboratories often contain equipment, chemicals, or organisms that 
are expensive or can be dangerous if handled by the untrained; and 
much biological research is considered controversial, attracting 
protestors and saboteurs. 
Biological laboratories are very expensive to set up and to 
maintain. Chemical reagents are often quite expensive, and must 
constantly be restocked. Specialized machines, such as centrifuges, 
automated DNA-sequencers, PCR thermocyclers, autoclaves, and 
powerful computers, along with laboratory renovations necessary to 
house them safely and computers to run the equipment, can cost 
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. Life-support 
equipment and technologies needed to keep laboratory organisms 
alive add additional expense. Establishing a new molecular biology 
laboratory for a principal investigator often costs the host institution 
millions of dollars. 
Highly skilled and, consequently, highly compensated laboratory 
technicians are required to maintain and run a successful and 
productive molecular biology laboratory. In addition, successful 
laboratories create entire ecosystems of researchers and other 
personnel, from professors or other principal investigators to visiting 
scholars, postdoctoral fellows, doctoral students, master‘s students, 
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undergraduate students, and various specialized technicians and other 
support staff. High-quality genetic research of the sort that is most 
likely to lead to the discovery or synthesis of valuable new genes 
relies upon these ecosystems for productivity, efficiency, and 
success. One would be hard-pressed to identify successful geneticists 
who act alone, without extensive education, training, and experience, 
or conduct their research using inexpensive or informal facilities. 
Although the proverbial garage entrepreneur may one day include the 
geneticist, that day has yet to arrive, and will not likely arrive in the 
near future.  
Another factor limiting open source biology is the need to 
exchange not just pure information, as can be done with the code of 
which computer software is comprised, but also physical elements, 
such as vectors, cells, or organisms. One can transmit, receive, and 
share computer code cheaply, instantly, and without a breath of 
institutional or government fiat. By contrast, exchange of biological 
materials must be done under strict conditions necessary to preserve 
the integrity of those materials, and must comply with safety 
protocols mandated by norms of the research community, rules of 
host institutions, and laws and regulations imposed by governments 
or their agencies. Such precautions add significantly to the cost and 
delay involved in such exchanges. In Coasian terms, transaction costs 
involved in genetic research are much more burdensome than those 
involved in software. 
Translating genetic research into products also entails significant 
costs in both time and money. Before a biological molecule or 
method can reach the market, the United States Food and Drug 
Administration must approve its safety and efficacy. This regulatory 
process can be extremely expensive, sometimes costing a company 
tens or hundreds of millions of dollars to complete. And there is no a 
priori guarantee that the results of the regulatory process will yield a 
green light for marketing the product or process. By contrast, there 
are few regulatory restrictions on implementing computer code; once 
it is ready to test, it can usually be posted to the Web or otherwise 
distributed without governmental permission. 
For reasons outlined above, open source biology may be most 
appropriate and effective when applied to upstream research tools 
rather than downstream applications of biology, like medicinal 
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drugs.
137
 Furthermore, the above reasons temper assumptions that the 
practice of biological research conforms to Mertonian ideals of 
collaboration, sharing, and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. 
A final potential limitation of open source biology involves the 
creation of incentives for innovation. An orthodox economic analysis 
of open source biology suggests that, in the absence of incentives 
created by proprietary rights, rates of biological innovation would be 
lower than for a system in which patent protection was available for 
inventions. As Steven Weber explains, 
Coca-Cola sells bottles of soda to consumers. Consumers use 
(that is, drink) the soda. Some consumers read the list of 
ingredients on the bottle, but that list of ingredients is 
surprisingly generic. Coca-Cola has a proprietary formula that 
it will not divulge, on the bottle or anywhere else. This formula 
is the knowledge that makes it possible for Coke to combine 
sugar, water, and a few other readily available ingredients in 
particular proportions with a secret flavoring mix and produce 
something of great value. The point is that the bubbly liquid in 
your glass cannot be reverse-engineered into its constituent 
parts. You can buy Coke and you can drink it, but you can‘t 
understand it in a way that would let you reproduce the drink, 
or improve upon it and distribute your cola drink to the rest of 
the world. 
 Standard economics of intellectual property rights provides 
a straightforward account of why the Coca-Cola production 
regime is organized this way. The core problem of intellectual 
property is supposed to be about creating incentives for 
innovators. Patents, copyrights, licensing schemes, and other 
means of ―protecting‖ knowledge ensure that economic rents 
are created and that some proportion of those rents can be 
appropriated by the innovator. If that were not the case, a new 
and improved formula would be immediately available in full 
and for free to anyone who chose to look at it. The person who 
invented the formula would have no special and defensible 
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economic claim on a share of the profits that might be made by 
selling drinks engineered from the innovation. And so the 
system unravels, because that person no longer has any rational 
incentive to innovate in the first place.
138
 
If rates of innovation would indeed be lower under a system of open 
source genetics than they would be for a system in which patent 
protection were available, then the implications for genetic 
enhancement would be complicated. 
V. OPEN SOURCE VERSUS PROPRIETARY GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
An open source model of genetic research and development likely 
would have a significant influence on the trajectory of human genetic 
enhancement. This trajectory likely would be markedly different 
from that occurring within a proprietary patent-based system. 
Comparing the likely outcomes for human genetic enhancement that 
would obtain under open source genetics and proprietary systems 
yields several predictions. Comparing a proprietary system with an 
open source genetics system yields the following three predictions: 
(1) rates of genetic innovation likely would be higher in a proprietary 
system than in an open source genetics system; (2) access to genetic 
innovations likely would be democratized in an open source genetics 
system as compared with in a proprietary system; and (3) combining 
predictions (1) and (2), an open source genetics system likely would 
yield a lower rate of genetic innovation, leading to a lower number of 
possible genetic enhancements, but those genetic enhancements that 
existed would be more widely available. 
Open source genetics would decrease rates of genetic 
enhancement innovation. There is little evidence to demonstrate that 
open source models of biology do, or would, spur innovation more 
than the prevailing patent system does. In fact, positive evidence 
suggesting that patent systems do, indeed, increase rates of 
innovation in bioscience, coupled with the dearth of evidence that 
open source genetics does so, suggests that proprietary systems 
would tend to yield more inventions related to genetic enhancement. 
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Since an open source genetics system would reduce the prospects that 
inventors could reliably recoup their considerable investments in 
research and development, fewer enhancing genes would tend to be 
discovered or synthesized. By contrast, a patent system allows 
geneticists to appropriate monopoly rents accruing from enhancing 
genes that they invent. 
Fewer genetic enhancement inventions would offer fewer 
potential options for enhancement, even to people with the 
wherewithal to gain access to the full array of existing genetic 
enhancement inventions. The potential degree to which parents could 
enhance their children would tend to be relatively lower than it would 
be under a proprietary system. One result would be to minimize the 
genetic distance between maximally genetically enhanced people and 
those without genetic enhancements. A smaller degree of potential 
genetic enhancement would yield smaller extremes in the genetic 
inequality within society. If genetic inequality arising from unequal 
access to genetic enhancement technologies tends to increase societal 
conflict and strife, then the existence of fewer genetic enhancement 
inventions could have beneficial societal effects by promoting 
stability and solidarity. 
On the other hand, the existence of fewer potential genetic 
enhancements could serve to thwart the ambitions of those members 
of society who value, and could afford access to, genetic 
enhancements. Though societal utility might increase through 
avoidance of extremes of genetic inequality, fewer potential genetic 
enhancements could lower the utility of genetically ambitious 
individuals. Furthermore, if genetic enhancements serve any general 
role in raising the standard of living for at least some people, then the 
lowered rates of genetic enhancement innovation would probably 
detract from this goal. 
If countries other than the United States offered superior patent 
protection for genetic enhancement inventions, research and 
development into genetic enhancement—along with much of the 
economic value such inventions could generate—might be expected 
to move out of the United States and into such countries. This result 
could harm the biotechnology industry of the United States, while 
simultaneously promoting it in other countries with more favorable 
attitudes towards genetic engineering. Furthermore, parents wishing 
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to genetically enhance their children could travel to more genetically 
innovative countries to ensure the genetic enhancement of those 
children. This result could erode at least some of the salutary 
implications of open source genetics in the United States, while 
simultaneously ensuring that spending on genetic enhancement 
research and development would tend to go offshore. 
Access to genetic enhancement innovations would become 
democratized in an open source genetics system as compared with 
proprietary systems. If genetic enhancements were made available at 
lower than the monopoly prices possible under a patent system, or 
without the restrictions made possible by the patent grant, access to 
the possibility of genetically enhancing one‘s children would be 
democratized and more widely spread among members of society. 
More parents would choose to have their children genetically 
enhanced. More children would tend to share the same genetic 
enhancements. And the genetic inequality that would almost certainly 
pertain under a patent system would likely not pertain under an open 
source genetics system. 
One corollary of this democratization of access to genetic 
enhancements would be the relative lack of advantages that might 
have been conferred by more exclusive genetic enhancements, 
because fewer children would be without the same genetic 
enhancements. On the other hand, democratization of genetic 
enhancement would probably lead to fewer available opportunities 
for genetic enhancement. The lessened ability to appropriate 
monopoly rents under an open source genetics system would likely 
lead to lower rates of genetic enhancement innovation. In other 
words, more members of society would have the option of enhancing 
their children with a relatively smaller number of potential genetic 
enhancements. 
A scenario of fewer available genetic enhancements spread more 
evenly among members of society would tend to foster societal 
solidarity. Commentators as philosophically disparate as Michael J. 
Sandel, Francis Fukuyama, and Lee Silver have worried about the 
effects that genetic enhancement might have on how individual 
members of society view their connectedness and sense of common 
purpose with other members of society. Sandel sees a threat to ―a 
willingness to share the fruits of good fortune through institutions of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/6
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social solidarity.‖139 Fukuyama sees advances in genetic enhancement 
as a dangerous threat to the essence of our humanity: ―Human nature 
shapes and constrains the possible kinds of political regimes, so a 
technology powerful enough to reshape what we are will have 
possibly malign consequences for liberal democracy and the nature of 
politics itself.‖140 And Silver speculates that genetic enhancement—a 
technology whose application he views as inevitable—has the 
potential to separate the GenRich from the Naturals to ―the final point 
of complete polarization.‖141 In the face of such anxieties about the 
societal effects of genetic enhancement, the prospect that open source 
genetics could deliver more equitable access to relatively fewer 
potential genetic enhancements could be viewed as desirable from a 
society-wide perspective. Open source genetics would seem to have a 
better chance of avoiding deep societal fissures between the 
genetically enhanced and unenhanced. 
On the other hand, wider access to existing genetic enhancements 
could increase the proportion of those in society who choose to 
enhance their children genetically. Instead of a relatively smaller 
societal experiment in human genetic enhancement carried out only 
among those people with the resources to afford patented genetic 
enhancements, open source genetics could allow and facilitate a 
much more widespread human genetic enhancement experiment 
encompassing a much larger proportion of the population. Adverse 
health or societal effects that might have been isolated within a 
relatively smaller group of affluent enhancers would instead be risked 
on many more members of society. 
An open source genetics system would lead to relatively fewer 
potential genetic enhancements that were relatively more widespread 
among members of society. Open source genetics would tend to lead 
to relatively fewer genetic enhancement inventions, but access to 
those existing genetic enhancements would be more widely available 
to members of society. In other words, more people would be able to 
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choose from a relatively smaller menu of genetic enhancements for 
their children. 
Equal or increased rates of genetic enhancement innovation. 
Despite evidence suggesting that patent systems tend to yield 
relatively larger rates of biotechnological innovation than open 
source genetics would tend to do, one ought to consider the 
possibility that open source genetics might equal, or even increase, 
rates of genetic enhancement innovation. If open source genetics 
were able to provide incentives for genetic enhancement innovation 
equal to, or greater than, those currently provided by the patent 
system, society would be faced with a double challenge. Not only 
would rates of genetic enhancement innovation be relatively high, but 
access to those genetic enhancements would also be relatively 
widespread. Although many proponents who promote open source 
models of biology might simultaneously hesitate to support human 
genetic enhancement, the result of open source genetics might be an 
acceleration of human genetic enhancement. 
Some commentators would welcome just such a future. John 
Harris, for example, has described the advantages of genetic 
enhancement technologies as follows: ―For the first time in human 
history we face the prospect of a truly open future, involving perhaps 
infinite sequential as well as simultaneous opportunities, and 
stretching, open-ended, before the individual in . . . an unprecedented 
but truly liberating pathway.‖142 Thus, if open source genetics were to 
lead to relatively high rates of genetic enhancement innovation, the 
results might be the application of the fruits of open source genetics 
on a scale as grand as the human population. Harris‘s ―open-ended‖ 
and ―truly liberating pathway‖ would hold implications of seismic 
proportions for the future of human society, and even future human 
evolution. To those who oppose human genetic enhancement, the 
prospect of open source genetics that achieves high rates of genetic 
enhancement innovation may be a Pandora‘s Box of societal risks 
that ought to remain unopened. Even so, current evidence suggests 
that open source genetics would not be capable of achieving rates of 
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genetic enhancement innovation to rival those achieved by patent 
systems. 
CONCLUSION 
Open source has been championed by many scholars as a superior 
system for promoting innovation, not only in software but latterly in 
biology.
143
 Though software code and genes appear superficially 
similar in the sense that they both serve as algorithms for the 
production of specified results, the former may be more conducive to 
the open source model of innovation than the latter. Nevertheless, if 
an open source model of genetics were adopted, the model could 
have significant effects on the future of human genetic enhancement. 
If open source genetics were unsuccessful or counterproductive in 
promoting genetic innovation, the result would be slowed discovery 
and development of genetic enhancements. Yet, if open source 
genetics were successful in spurring genetic innovation, at least two 
results would be likely: (1) acceleration in the rate of innovation in 
new genetic enhancements, and (2) acceleration of the widespread 
adoption of genetic enhancements. By contrast, proprietary patent 
protection for genetic enhancements would tend to spur genetic 
innovation, but would tend to limit access to those genetic 
enhancements through discriminatory mechanisms such as price and 
favoritism. 
Open source genetics likely would offer different societal 
outcomes for genetic enhancement than would proprietary patent 
systems. Furthermore, the societal implications of an open source 
genetics approach to genetic enhancement likely would not have the 
simple, salutary effects many in the open biology movement tend to 
assume. Rather, open source genetics might lead to more widespread 
genetic enhancement than would proprietary patent approaches, 
though the potential pool of available genetic enhancements likely 
would be smaller. A proprietary patent approach would likely ensure 
high rates of genetic enhancement innovation, research, and 
development, and efficiently mediate access to genetic enhancements 
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but likely would allow access to genetic enhancements to fewer 
members of society. With both open source genetics and proprietary 
patent approaches, there remains the prospect that genetic 
enhancement might lead to human evolutionary change. 
Public policy and the law must grapple with the implications of 
genetic enhancement before current technological possibilities 
become societal realities. Open source genetics offers a significant 
alternative to the prospect of the patent system as a substantial arbiter 
of parental decisions regarding genetic enhancement of their 
offspring. Open source genetics holds the potential to democratize 
accessibility of genetic enhancements, while discouraging high rates 
of genetic enhancement innovation. However, the implications that 
open source genetics has for the future of human society—and even 
human evolution—are not clearly more beneficial than the 
implications the patent system would have. It is certain that the 
implications that open source genetics and proprietary patent systems 
have for future human genetic enhancement should be subjected to 
thorough analysis and debate prior to the imminent arrival of human 
genetic enhancement technologies. 
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